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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE •'•".' 
The appellant, Galveston Sonny Scott, herein appeals from his 
conviction of the crime of manslaughter in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT '• 
The jury impaneled in the matter found the defendant,guilty of 
the crime of manslaughter,' a felony of the second degree, on October 26, 
1974. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve an 
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indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of from one to fifteen years, 
as provided by law. • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
• ' • • i ' i ' . * ' . • . < • • • ' • • • ' • ' ' , . ' • • 
Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment of the trial 
court and remand of the matter for a new trial, / 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 1, 1974, at approximately 1:50 a .m. , the appellant 
herein, accompanied by a friend, one Binky Coleman, entered the Beehive 
Lodge of Elks at 248 West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. Shortly 
after appellant entered the Lodge, an altercation ensued between appellant 
and his companion and two other individuals, one Gray and one "Blood. " 
Numerous shots were exchanged in the altercation and the upshot of the 
encounter was that two persons, David Allen Gray and Phillip Dawson, 
were killed. 
Conflicting testimony was adduced at trial regarding the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the shooting. Defendant produced at trial 
numerous witnesses supportive of defendants contention that he acted in 
self-defense. At trial, testimony was had to the effect that (A) the individuals 
involved in the shootout with the appellant had earlier threatened appellant 
at his home while armed with weapons in a dispute involving some rings 
allegedly owned by the decedent David Allen Gray (Tr. 359); (B) that the 
individuals involved in the shootout with appellant had previously assaulted 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appellant on the Saturday night preceding the shootout, that they had, used 
weapons on that occasion, and that numerous shots were exchanged at that 
time (Tr. 311-313, 321, 380-383); and (C) that on the occasion of the com-
mission of the crime of which defendant-appellant was convicted, the other 
individuals involved had opened fire on the defendant precedent to defendant 
shooting back, and that the defendant had returned the fire in self-defense 
(Tr. 281, 300, 302, 333-334, 338, 372). 
During the course of trial, counsel for the defendant moved the 
trial court to permit the jury to view the crime scene. The trial court 
took the matter under advisement. (Tr. 266.) At a later juncture, 
subsequent to both parties having rested their respective cases, defendant's 
counsel renewed the motion to view the crime scene. The motion was 
. j • • • • • . • • . • • • ' " • , . ' . ' ' 
granted by the court with the proviso that neither the defendant nor 
counsel for the defendant nor any other persons other than the jurors and 
the deputies who accompanied them could be in attendance upon the viewing. 
Defendants counsel duly excepted to the court's ruling upon grounds that 
the viewing of the crime scene was a critical stage of the prosecution and, 
therefore, the defendant, counsel, and other court personnel should be 
in attendance, x (Tr. 434-435.) 
At a later juncture in the trial, in the course of defense counsel's 
summation, counsel directed the jury's attention to the fact that the other 
individuals involved in the shootout at the Beehive Elk's Lodge, the 
• • • " ' • V ' • ' " • • / ' ' • ' • • , ' ' . ' • . . V ~ 6 - , ' l v - ^ ' . " k ; V , .••• ' • • ; • • • • , • • • . • • • : • • • . •• ' 
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decedent David Allen Gray and one "Blood, " had earlier assaulted the 
appellant and a companion with a rifle. At that juncture, counsel was 
attempting to point out to the jury that even though appellant had sought 
out the individuals who had earlier assaulted him, the defendant acted in 
self-defense in so doing in response to an earlier incident in which 
appellant's life had been placed in jeopardy. At this point the court 
interrupted counsel to advise counsel and the jury that such defense was 
unavailable because the "agressor" for the purpose of defining the via-
bility of a defense of self-defense is determined at the time of the com-
mission of the offense charged. The court, by its actions, essentially 
foreclosed that area of comment by counsel. (Tr. 488-489.) 
Subsequent to both parties having rested their respective cases, 
the jury retired to consider the matter. Upon deliberation, the jury 
returned a verdict against defendant-appellant of guilty on one count of 
Criminal Homicide -- Manslaughter, and judgment was duly entered by 
the trial court accordingly. (Tr. 544.) From that verdict and judgment 
the defendant-appellant brings this appeal. 
] ARGUMENT 
' POINT I r v.-; ••/' •/•••,; . :;•••';• V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER 
DEFENDANT, HIS COUNSEL, NOR NECESSARY COURT 
, PERSONNEL COULD BE IN ATTENDANCE UPON THE 
VIEWING BY THE JURY OF THE CRIME SCENE. 
• ' • • • . • . . : - 7 - . ' ' :•''•:•.•' > ? • • V ' ; ' ' ' ' ' • , ; " : ' ' . . ' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
During the course of trial in the instant matter, counsel for the 
defendant moved the trial court to permit the jury to view the crime scene. 
The trial court took the matter under advisement. (Tr. 266.) At a later , 
juncture, subsequent to both parties having rested their respective cases, 
defendant's counsel renewed the motion to view the crime scene. The 
motion was granted by the court with the proviso that neither the defendant 
nor counsel for the defendant nor any other persons other than the jurors 
and the deputies who accompanied them could be in attendance upon the 
viewing. Defendant's counsel duly excepted to the court's ruling upon 
grounds that the viewing of the crime scene was a critical stage of the 
prosecution and, therefore, defendant, counsel, and other court personnel 
should be in attendance. (Tr| 434-435.) 
It is well established as a matter of law that trial courts possess 
the discretionary power to grant a view of the premises constituting the 
locus of a crime. Such proposition is so well established as to be beyond 
all dispute, as shown in the following cases: Schoenfield v. United States, 
277 F. 934 (2d Cir . , 1921), cert, denied 258 U.S. 623, 66 L.Ed. 796, 42 
S.Ct. 316 (1922); Massenberg v. United States, 19 F.2d62 (4th Cir . , 1927); 
Brown v. State, 229 Ala. 58, 755 So. 358 (1934); Bates v. State, 24 Ala. 
App. 606, 139 So. 879 (1932); People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 50 N. E. 947 
(1898); Starr v. State, 5 Akla. Crim. Rep. 440, 115 P. 356 (1911). See also, 
Roberts v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky.L.Rep. 2207, 80 S. W. 457 (1893); Young 
v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 708, 133 S. W. 791 (1911); State v. Dunn, 161 La. 
: . : ' ' • . - . : - ' ' : ' • • • • • - 8 - ; • : ' ' • . • • ' " , : : : , • ' • : , : ' : ' ' • ' , • Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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532, 109 So. 56 (1926); State v. Seal, 175 La. 103, 143 So. 18 (1932); 75 
Am.Jur.2d, Trials, § 72 et. seq.; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 295 
et. seq.; 124 A.L.R. 141. 
In Starr v. State, supra, the Oklahoma Supreme Court clearly ,.' 
enunciated the basic principle to be applied by a trial court considering a 
motion for viewing of the crime scene. Li its decision the court said: 
When requested by the state or the defendant, 
it is the common practice in the courts of this 
country to permit the jury to visit and view the 
premises where it is alleged the crime was 
committed, when in the discretion of the court 
a view is deemed expedient to enable the jury 
to better understand and apply the evidence 
presented in court. (115 P. at 366.) 
Similarly, in People v. Thorn, supra, involving a prosecution for 
murder, the New York Supreme Court held that the granting or refusing of 
a view by the jury of the place where the crime was charged to have been 
committed was within the discretion of the trial court under a statute 
providing for such view when in the opinion of the court it is necessary to 
assist the jury in understanding the facts of the case. 
In its opinion, the court tersely encapsulated the applicable rule; 
(It is) . . . discretionary with the trial judge 
as to whether the view should be had . . . 
(50N.E. at 951.) • ; • ' • ' • • > • ' 
From the above cases and authority, it should be immediately 
apparent that a viewing of the crime scene is properly permitted at the 
trial court's discretion when such viewing is deemed expedient by the court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to enable the jury to better understand and apply the evidence presented to 
the court. Thus, there can be no dispute here regarding the authority of 
the trial court, at its discretion, to grant a viewing of the crime scene by 
the jury. In this case, the nub issue then is not the trial courtfs authority 
to grant such motion, but whether the manner in which the court exercised 
such authority in this particular instance deprived defendant of substantial 
rights by denying his opportunity and right to be present at such viewing. 
There is substantial authority for the proposition that a defendant 
in a criminal case must and should be accorded an opportunity, once the 
trial court has exercised its discretionary power to permit a viewing of 
the crime scene, to accompany the jurors and necessary court personnel 
to the scene and participate with them in said viewing. Pierce v. Common-
wealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923); State v. Garden, 267 Minn. 97, 
128 N.W.2d 891 (, ); People v. Auerbach, 176 Mich. 23, 141 N.W. 869 
(1913); State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 40 P. 372 (1895); State v. Slorah, 
118 Me. 203, 106 A. 768 (1919); Freeman v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 850, 
10 S.W.2d 827 (1928); State v, Saunders, 268 Mo. 202 ( ); Noell v. 
Commonwealth, 138 Va. , 115 S.E. 679 (1923). See also, Carver v. 
Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 2d 375 (1953). 
In Freeman v. Commonwealth, supra, the Court of Appeals for 
Kentucky had before it the issue of whether a defendant in a criminal case 
had a right to be present on the occasion of a viewing by the jury of the 
scene of a homicide* The court concluded that, indeed, a defendant does 
. ' ! • • • • - 1 0 - . • • V - , ; ^ y , ; ; / , - . , : ••.'': " ..• ""••' Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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possess such right, and particularly in a homicide case where, as in the; 
instant case, counsel had vigorously objected to defendant's absence at 
the time of the viewing. In its decision, the court said: , ";•'"••;' 
The jury was allowed to view the premises !, 
where the homicide was committed in the 
absence of appellant. This appears in an r 
order properly entered which shows the ' ; ' 
objection of the appellant. The order also 
shows that appellant was absent when the 
premises were first viewed by the jury. ' 
It has been held that the viewing of the 
premises is the receiving of evidence, 
and that it is error to allow the jury to 
view the premises in the absence of the 
accused. (10 S.W.2d at 827.) 
Similarly, in Pierce v. Commonwealth, supra, the Court of Appeals 
for Virginia had before it the identical issue of whether the defendant in a 
homicide prosecution has a right to be present on the occasion of the 
viewing by the jury of the crime scene. In affirmatively answering the 
proposition, Justice West observed: 
A conviction either of manslaughter or of , ,, 
murder in the second degree would be 
affirmed but for this fact which is disclosed • 
by the record: The jury were permitted to 
view the premises while the accused remained 
in the courtroom. In the judgment of the 
other members of the court, and for the reasons 
fully stated in the opinion in the case of Noell v. 
Commonwealth (Va.) 115 S. E. 679, this day 
handed down, this was error, because the 
presence of the accused at the view was essential 
to the validity of the conviction. (115 S. E. at 692.) 
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for Virginia fully sets forth the rationale behind the rule that a defendant 
is entitled to be present on the occasion of the viewing by the jury of the 
locus of the crime charged. In its opinion, the court states: 
The next inquiry to be disposed of is this: 
When a view is ordered in a felony case, does 
the prisoner always have the right to accom-
pany the jury if he so desires? The answer,
 v 
by what appears to be a clear majority of the 
decided cases, is in the affirmative. In 16 
Corpus Juris, p. 816, the text says: 
'••"It is generally held that the defendant is 
entitled to be present when the jury are 
taken to view the place of the crime, on the :• 
. ground that this is the taking of evidence and 
a part of the trial, f f 
and a number of cases are cited in support of 
this statement. 
In Starr v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 440, 115 P. 
356, the court says that - -
"It. would be better and safer for him to 
accompany the jury, if convenient, to see , 
that nothing improper occurs at the view." 
And it may be confidently asserted that the 
authorities generally are in accord in holding 
that the trial courts ought always to permit 
the prisoner to attend if he so desires. As 
said in State v. Slorah, 118 Me. 203, 106 
Atl. 758, 4A.L .R . 1256: '
 ; ' ' 
"The right of the accused to be present, 
* * * if he demands it, is very generally 
••"• recognized as inherent under a proper 
consideration of the rights of the respon-
dent in a criminal case. "' (115 S. E. at 681.) 
-12-
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Applying the rationale of the above cited cases and authority to 
the facts in the instant case, it is clear that the appellant herein was 
deprived by the ruling of the trial court of his right to be present on the , 
occasion ot the jury's visit to the crime scene. It is submitted that such 
ruling deprived defendant of his right to monitor the viewing so as to 
prevent improper or inappropriate conduct on the part of the jurors or 
others. It is further submitted that such ruling deprived defendant of his 
right to be present when evidence was taken and of his right to be present 
at all critical stages of his prosecution. This court should reverse the 
ruling of the trial court and remand this matter to the court below for a 
new trial. . ' . '•/,"' .',• . •;'.:'• /•• ••'.''.'•.'•' 
P O I N T i i ; ; • • ; ' • ' • ' . ' ' " • ' : • ; ' . . •• '• '•: : : ; 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERRUPTING DEFENSE , 
COUNSEL'S SUMMATION TO REMARK TO THE JURY 
THAT APPELLANT COULD NOT PROPERLY CLAIM THE 
DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE IN A SITUATION WHERE 
APPELLANT HAD SOUGHT OUT INDIVIDUALS WHO 
EARLIER HAD ASSAULTED HIM. 
In the course of defense counsel's summation, counsel directed the 
jury's attention to the fact that, prior to the shootout at the Beehive Elk's 
Lodge, the other individuals involved, the decedent David Allen Gray and • 
one "Blood, " had assaulted the appellant and a companion with a rifle. At 
that juncture, counsel was attempting to point out to the jury that even 
though appellant had sought out the individuals who earlier assaulted him, 
v • •• • '• - 1 3 - ' • ' • / • ' . ' • ' ' • " . " • • ' . : . ' - . ; . 
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the defendant acted in self-defense in so doing in response to an earlier 
incident in which appellant's life had been placed in jeopardy. Counsel 
was further attempting to point out that since the other individuals had 
previously assaulted appellant, it was likely that they and not appellant 
had fired the first shots at the Beehive Elkfs Lodge and that defendant had 
returned their fire in self-defense. 
MR. HANSEN: . . . It's undisputed, there isn't 
one witness that disputes that the first shooting 
involved in this couple of days' spree was with a 
rifle by Gray and Blood at Sonny Scott in the alley 
, behind the Elk's Club, the one who first does it, 
and that was in the alley Saturday night, and with 
their way of life --
, THE COURT: Mr. Hansen, I am going to have 
to interrupt you. 
MR.HANSEN: That's fine. 
THE COURT: The aggressor is determined at 
the time that the self-defense is claimed, not by 
prior acts, although prior acts may have an 
influence on what occurred at the time. You may 
proceed. I'm sorry to interrupt you. ; 
MR. HANSEN: May I note my exception to that? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. HANSEN: Thank you. 
(Tr. 488-489.) ^ .'•'-••••/r^'''-' \ '', / 
The extent to which the above reported colloquy confused and 
misled the jury may be seen at a later juncture when the jury, subsequent 
-14-
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to the giving of the court's instructions and subsequent to several hours of 
deliberation, returned to the court and requested clarification on the issue 
of how far and to what extent an individual can go in pursuing another 
individual in the exercise of his right to self-defense: , 
i ' ' , , ' • • ' • • . 
COURT: The record may show that the jury 
has come back into the courtroom, it's my 
understanding that you have another question, 
is that correct Mr. Foreman? 
FOREMAN: Yes, that's correct. ' 
COURT: And does that refer to any fact 
situation? 
FOREMAN: , This is a specific question ;-
with respect to the law. 
COURT: All right, before we take your ' \ 
second -- well, tell us what your second 
problem is, what is that with reference to? 
FOREMAN: The same section. 
COURT: Same set? 
FOREMAN: Yes, that's correct. 
COURT: All right, I'll allow you to state 
what the problem is and what doesn't appear 
to be clear. 
FOREMAN: Well, basically the question is, 
I suppose, under the law --
COURT: Let me put it to you this way, I ; , 
don't want argument or to know how you're 
trying to go, but if you can just put it in a 
, way that will tell me your problem. 
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FOREMAN: I'm not sure that I can. 
COURT: Well, just do the best you 
. . ' • . • •
 c a n
' • , ' • . ' . ; ' . . • , ' • ' ' • . . ; . . ' • •'.'• • • ' ' • > ; , • ' • • ' .'' 
FOREMAN: How far can a man go in 
pursuing someone under the law, under 
.the guise of self-defense. That is, • • 
basically, is a man justified under the 
^rules of self-defense to go after the man
 : ' , 
' • : , o r " " ' " . ' ' ' • • ' ' ', . ' • • • . ' ' • • • • - ^ • ' ' ' ' • ' ' ' . , . ' ' . : 
' COURT: I think I see your problem. 
, Let me see if I see it correctly. Well, : ; 
is that the second question you had to 
' ' " a s k ? • • ' . : • • •'• • . • . • • ' . . • • • • ' : ' ' . • ' . • • • , 
, . ,(Tr. 540.) y-.:--r: - ' ' - '' "''•;•••:' ' .•"•'•. ";';• 
From the above it should be readily apparent that the effect of the 
trial court's earlier remarks in interrupting counsel's summation was to 
confuse the jury as to whether or not, ip the exercise of his right and 
privilege of self-defense, the defendant was justified in pursuing the 
original assailants and seeking them out. The court's remarks constituted, 
as it were, an additional instruction to the jury to the effect that appellant 
could not so act consistent with his right of self-defense. As a result, such 
remarks improperly prejudiced appellant's right to present his defense 
to the jury and such remarks, therefore, were reversible error . 
It is clearly established as a matter of law that the defense of 
self-defense is available to an individual even though the individual acts 
affirmatively in response to an act or threat on the part of another and 
even though that act or threat is removed in time and circumstance from 
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the fatal encounter that results, so long as the acts of self-defense involved 
are so closely connected with the original difficulty in time and circumstances 
as to be fairly regarded as having been brought on by the original difficulty. 
State v. Lee, 85 S.C. 101, 67 S.E. 141 (1910); 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, 
§ 145. As a correlary, one may go so far in the exercise of his right of 
self-defense as to seek out the adversary or original assailant and arm 
oneself precedent to doing so. Jones v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 133, 45 
S. E.2d 908 (1948); State v. Feeley, 194 Mo. 300, 92 S. W. 663 (1906); 
State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); State v. Doris, 51 Or. 
136, 94 P. 44 (1908); Gray v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 90, 114 S.W. 635 (1908); 
Beard v. State, 47 Tex. Crim. 50, 81 S.W. 33 (1904); State v. Flory, 40 
Wyo. 184, 276P. 458 (1929); Bonnard v. State, 25 Tex. App. 173, 7 S.W. 
862 (1888); and King v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 208, 101 S.W. 237 (1907). 
Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 145, states part of the above set forth 
rule as follows: j 
The fault . . . is not confined to the precise , 
time of the fatal encounter which results, 
but may include a fault so closely connected 
with the difficulty in time or circumstance 
as to be fairly regarded as operating to , ; 
bring it on. 
In State v. Lee, supra, the South Carolina Supreme Court had 
before it the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge 
the jury that the "fault, " for the purpose of determining the viability of 
a defense of self-defense, must be at the time of the fatal encounter and 
.•••'• ' • . ' . ' . •' - 1 7 - • ; ' ' ' ' • • ^ • . • ^ : i : : y - . • " • : y - y \ . - . - / - H ' - - - : . ; ; : 
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not at some previous time. In ruling that such charge would have been 
improper and unduly restrictive, the Supreme Court said: 
The third exception assigns error in refusing 
to charge the defendant's seventh request as 
follows: "Fault in bringing on a difficulty 
so as to deprive one of the right of self-defense
 t < 
must be a fault at the time of the fatal encounter, 
and not a fault at some previous time. t f The 
court refused to charge in that language. The 
instruction requested was inaccurate and mis-
leading in restricting the fault in bringing on 
the difficulty to the precise time of the fatal 
encounter and in excluding from consideration ; . 
fault, which, although not occurring at the 
precise time of the difficulty, but previously, 
may have been so closely connected with the 
difficulty in time and circumstances as to be 
fairly regarded as operating to bring it on. 
(67S.E. at 142.) 
Applying the above quoted rule and the reasoning of the above 
cited cases to the facts in this case, it is clear that the defense of self-
defense would be available to the defendant Galveston Sonny Scott in this 
case even though he was acting affirmatively in seeking out the individuals 
I ' . • ' ' - , ' / • . • • ' • ••' . • ' . ' • • 
who had earlier assaulted him and even though he armed himself precedent 
to doing so. This is the case since the acts of the decedent and MBloodtf 
in assaulting defendant with weapons on the preceding Saturday were so , 
closely related in time and circumstances to the later encounter at the , 
Beehive Elk's Lodge as to be fairly regarded as having brought on such 
encounter. Since this is so, counsel for the defendant had a right and, 
indeed, a duty to present to the jury in his summation his theory that the 
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decedent Gray and his companion "Blood were the original aggressors 
and that defendant had acted in self-defense in seeking them out. The 
court, by its ruling, effectively precluded presentation of such theory 
and thereby foreclosed to defendant one of his alternative defenses. 
From the above it should be obvious that the defendant-appellant 
was entitled to rely upon the defense of self-defense, that he was entitled 
to call the jury's attention to the fact that the other individuals were the 
original aggressors, and that their aggression was not sufficiently removed 
in time and circumstance for the defense of self-defense to be unavailable 
to appellant even though he sought them out subsequent to the initial 
encounter and even though he armed himself precedent to doing so. As 
a result, the trial court's remarks were misleading and prejudicial and 
clearly constitute reversible error0 This court should reverse the con-
viction of defendant-appellant and remand the matter for a i^ ew trial. 
| CONCLUSION - ' 
The trial court erred in ruling that neither defendant, his counsel, 
nor necessary court personnel could be in attendance upon the viewing by 
the jury of the crime scene. Further, the trial court erred in interrupting 
defense counsel's summation to remark to the jury that appellant could not 
properly claim the defense of self-defense in a situation where appellant 
had sought out individuals who earlier had assaulted him. This court 
should reverse the verdict and judgment of the trial court and remand ^ 
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the matter for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
By [CLcPf^J-^ 
Phil L. Hansen 
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